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DEFINITIONS 
 
The verification theory of meaning aims to characterise what it is for a sentence to be meaningful 
and also what kind of abstract object the meaning of a sentence is. A brief outline is given by 
Rudolph Carnap, one of the theory's most prominent defenders: 
If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its 
meaning is. [...] thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we 
determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is 
possible. [4: 420] 
In short, the verification theory of meaning claims that the meaning of a sentence is the method 
of its verification. 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE THEORY 
 
Historical Background. Verificationism can only be fully appreciated in the larger context of the 
philosophical credo it emerged from, namely 20th century logical empiricism (also known as 
logical positivism) [2]. 
An empiricist subscribes at least to the following doctrine: no oracle, intuition, pure 
reasoning, etc., can reveal what the world is like. All factual knowledge has its sole source in 
sense experience. For example, if you want to understand how the human brain works there is no 
other way to knowledge than via observation, especially via empirical experiments.  
This epistemic doctrine (see epistemology) about the nature and source of factual 
knowledge had already been put forward by the classical empiricists in the 17th and 18th century. 
The novelty of 20th century logical empiricism is a shift in focus from this doctrine about 
knowledge to a doctrine about (scientific) language. More exactly, the logical empiricists tried to 
underpin the validity of the doctrine about factual knowledge with a doctrine about sentence 
meaning. This is where the verification theory of meaning has its place. 
Suppose we stipulate that the meaning of a statement (a sentence, a proposition) is given 
by the actions performed to find out if it is true. Or stronger, that a sentence has to be discarded 
as meaningless unless one can offer a description of what fact or state of affairs has to be 
observable so that this sentence can be said to be true or false. That is precisely what the 
verification theory of meaning demands: "The meaning of a proposition is the method of its 
verification." [10: 148]  
Suppose furthermore that all factual knowledge is expressed in meaningful sentences. 
Then, together with the verification theory of meaning, we arrive back at the epistemic doctrine 
from above: factual knowledge has its justification in observation. Thus, verificationism is a 
linguistic counterpart of the empiricists' doctrine about knowledge. 
Both logical empiricism and the verification theory of meaning are, however, outdated 
theories. This is not because the general idea behind them—that empirical knowledge depends on 
sense experience—has been given up by philosophers. Rather, verificationism faced a few 
unsolvable technical difficulties. A closer look at the verification theory of meaning as well as 
applications of the theory will unveil some of these problems. 
 
Verificationim and the Hierarchy of Language. The verificationist theory of meaning has a by-
product: logical empiricists perceive language to be hierarchically structured. Observational 
terms are at the basis of that structure and all other terms further down the hierarchy are 
translatable into terms of this basis. Logic and conceptual analysis is the central tool to arrive at 
such translations of non-observational terms to observational terms. What does this mean? 
Take a sentence like "This apple is red". The verification theory of meaning claims that it 
is meaningful if and only if we can describe which state of affairs has to be observable so that the 
sentence can be said to be true. In this case, the task seems to be rather easy: "This apple is red" 
is, indeed, a meaningful sentence—it is true if the apple in front of us is really red, i.e., if, under 
normal light conditions, it appears red to us, and false if not.  
However, not every sentence contains terms that refer to directly observable features of 
easily observable objects. For those sentences it is difficult to see how the verificationist criterion 
can be met. For example, what kind of observation verifies sentences like "This fluid has a 
temperature of 100°C" or, worse, "The electron's mass is me = 9.11 x 10-31kg"? 
For these sentences to meet the verificationist criterion of meaning an intermediate step 
seems unavoidable: scientific terms which do not refer themselves to directly observable features 
of the world have to be analysed or reduced to descriptive terms that do so (see operationalism). 
Those sentences that contain non-observational terms can, with the help of these analyses, be 
translated into sentences that are observational. Only then can the verification criterion of 
meaning be applied. 
Here is an example: "object O has temperature T" can be analysed into the phrase "if a 
mercury thermometer is placed into or near by object O the mercury will rise (or fall) to mark T". 
With the help of this analysis we can translate "This fluid has a temperature of 100°C" into "if a 
mercury thermometer is placed into this fluid the mercury will rise (or fall) to mark 100". The 
latter sentence clearly indicates which possible observation would verify it. Hence, according to 
verificationism, the sentence has meaning. 
The actual reduction of all terms (or sentences) to observational terms (or sentences) is, of 
course, a utopian dream. In any case, the general possibility of such a reduction would suffice to 
support the empiricists' credo. Attempts to prove the general possibility have indeed been given 
[5]. 
 
Verificationism and Metaphysics. It is easy to see how both the conceptual analysis of terms 
and the verificationist doctrine about sentence meaning could be used as a tool to criticise or even 
ridicule metaphysical philosophy. Indeed, to show that metaphysics does not make any sense at 
all was part of the empiricists' programme. Terms like god, nothingness, or meaning of life are 
not suitable for analysis into observational terms and are, hence, not apt to figure in meaningful, 
verifiable sentences and philosophical research in general. They can, at best, be used to express a 
general attitude towards life, a Lebensgefühl, but they have no factual content [3].  
  
Verificationism and Behaviourism. There is a close relation between verificationism and 
behaviourism (see behaviourism, logical). The aforementioned idea of a reduction of all 
scientific terms and sentences to observable terms and sentences means, too, that psychological 
terms, i.e., terms concerning the human mind, have to be translatable into observational 
language. This is precisely what behaviourism asks for: attributions of mental states to people 
(like "Agnes is happy") must be translated into statements about their observable behaviour or, at 
least, their dispositions to behave. 
Take the sentences "Alfons desires a good bottle of wine". Such an ascriptions of a mental 
state to a person can only be admitted into scientific language if we can, according to the 
verificationist theory of meaning, describe the way we determine its truth or falsehood in 
observable terms. Hence, in order to give the meaning of that sentence we would have to say 
something along the following lines: "Alfons loves wine" is true if and only if (1) Alfons reaches 
for a bottle of wine when he sees one standing on the table, (2) Alfons utters the words "Yes, 
please!" when someone offers him a glass of claret, (3) Alfons seeks a wine shop when he has got 
the money and time, etc. This list amounts to a catalogue of observable stimulus and response 
connections (see testability). It offers thereby testing conditions and so gives the meaning of the 
initial sentence. In this way, statements about mental states are generally thought to be reduced to 
sentences about behaviour (or dispositions to behave). 
 
Problems with Behaviourism and Verificationism. There are, however, severe problems for 
behaviourism and consequently for verificationism. For a start note that the list given above 
seems to be endless. Wine lovers do various other things additional to those listed above. Yet, 
when can we stop and be sure to have reached the full meaning of the sentence which is to be 
analysed? Is it not rather doubtful that there is a comprehensive catalogue of stimulus response 
entries? 
Furthermore, some wine lovers might not always be disposed to do the things listed: they 
might have interfering wishes, other preferences or they might obey certain prohibitions. Alfons 
could be a wine lover but he might not touch any alcohol for religious reasons. Hence, some sort 
of proviso will have to be added to the stimuli conditions: if Alfons sees a bottle of wine and no 
other wish or desire or prohibition or promise etc. prevents him from poring himself a glass then 
he will do so. However, the verificationist is still not off the hook since the word preventing 
which occurs in the proviso clause is again an unobservable mental predicate (we were not 
talking about Alfons being observably chained to the chair but about other desires preventing 
him). In trying to reduce a statement about one mental state to observational language we have 
again to use non-observational mental terms and it is questionable whether we can ever escape. 
This vicious regress is also a danger when it comes to non-mental non-observational terms. 
 
Verificationism and Physics: Further Problems. Aside from the realm of the mental, 
verificationism has difficulties with statements from the very science which should cause the 
least problems, namely physics. Consider a law hypothesis like "All masses attract each other". 
Which kind of observation would conclusively establish this sentence's truth and hence its 
meaning? No doubt, this difficulty relates back to the traditional problems of induction of how to 
conclude from some observed events to all of them (including unobserved ones). In the guise of a 
puzzle about meaning, the problem of induction is, however, aggravated: not only is it difficult to 
define what would provide conclusive evidence for "All masses attract each other". For 
verificationism the lack of such a characterisation would mean that law hypotheses do not form 
meaningful sentences. Hence, they should be dropped from scientific language. And yet, this is 
unacceptable for they are, arguably, central to any scientific enterprise. Note that similar 
problems arise from sentences about past events for which observations are in principle 
impossible.  
There have been attempts to reformulate verificationism in weaker forms to avoid these 
consequences: now, observations should only be somehow relevant to the determination of the 
truth or falsehood of sentences [8], [1: 18-19]. However, instead of going further into detail of 
those reformulations (which have been unsuccessful in the end) it is worth turning to problems on 
a more abstract level. The first concerns the status of the verificationist doctrine itself. The 
second challenges tacit presuppositions of verificationism which turned out to be untenable. 
 
 
Verificationsim applied to itself. Ironically, the verificationist doctrine itself falls short of its 
own high demands. Take the statement: "Sentences have meaning only in so far as they are 
empirically verifiable". Are there possible observations which could prove the truth of this very 
sentence? It seems not. But then the doctrine itself lacks meaning, i.e., it is a statement like 
metaphysical claims without any sensible content. The logical empiricists' response to this charge 
was to claim that the verification criterion is prescriptive rather than descriptive in character. It is 
meant to be a recommendation to scientists of what is best to be counted as proper scientific 
language; it is not meant to be a factual statement. Note that a similar answer has been offered for 
other indispensable non-factual claims, like mathematical or logical statements, or sentences 
which state conceptual truths. (See necessity; necessity, conceptual.) 
 
Verificationism and Meaning Holism. Still more problematic for verificationism is a thesis 
called meaning holism. Take again the sentence "if a mercury thermometer is placed into this 
fluid the mercury will raise (or fall) to mark 100". Suppose your observation speaks against its 
truth. The mercury does not move at all. Unsurprisingly, it is possible to make adjustments at 
various other points in our belief-system such that we could, in principle, nonetheless stick to the 
sentence: we could, for example, doubt that liquids always extend when the temperature rises and 
the pressure remains constant; we could suppose that the thermometer is broken; we could claim 
that thermometer's scale has been wrongly calibrated, etc. 
The upshot of this thought experiment is that the verificationists' assumption that 
isolated sentences alone face the tribunal of observational evidence is not justified. It is always a 
whole bunch of interrelated sentences—a whole belief system—which is tested by observation. 
This is a thesis which came to be known as meaning holism and was argued for by W. V. Quine 
[9]. Single sentences are too small a unit to be verifiable by experience. Instead "the unit of 
empirical significance is the whole of science." [9: 42]. But if this is so the verification theory of 
meaning which is defined for single sentences is false from the outset. 
 
Verificationsim rejected. The prima facie attractive verificationist doctrine proves to be 
untenable for various reasons: (1) It turned out to be difficult if not impossible to apply the 
verificationist theory of meaning in a concrete case: this has been shown in the example from 
behaviourism. Endless lists and regresses threaten the success of an analysis. (2) It was necessary 
to rewrite the verificationist doctrine several times, as underlined by the example of law 
statements which would otherwise have to be discarded as being nonsense. (3) The self-
application of the doctrine reveals its own non-empirical status; and finally, (4), the hidden 
presupposition that sentences are the units of observational verification had to be dropped and so 
verificationism as a whole. 
 
The Remnants of Verifictionism. It should be mentioned that some verificationist ideas still live 
on and are indeed worth pursuing. For philosophical theories of sentence meaning it is essential 
to hold on to the strong link between truth and meaning: some philosophers claim that giving the 
truth conditions of a sentence (not the verification conditions for its truth, though) is giving the 
meaning of that sentence [6]. The philosopher Michael Dummett even revived a verificationism 
which is, in some respects, akin to the logical empiricist's doctrine. As a result, Dummett had to 
adopt anti-realist positions (compare realism) when it comes, for example, to statements about 
laws of nature or the past: he claims that statements whose truth cannot decisively be verified are 
neither true nor false [7]. 
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